ointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and
induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr.
Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region
of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The
matter had now passed into the domain of action."

To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at
the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together
with the new battleship _Queen Elizabeth_, the battle cruiser
_Inflexible_, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February
19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force
bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the
batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part
silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however,
interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of
ammunition. The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of
the Turks, still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which
at terrible hazards was carried on at night within the Straits.

In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the
Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military
attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which
was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to
Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb. 22
to March 16--an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17, however, the
troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent were assembled
at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton had arrived
to take command. His instructions included the statement that
"employment of military forces on any large scale at this juncture
is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to get through
after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered on the project
of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the
scheme."

On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking
whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard
for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing
a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive
our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the
opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately
fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened
at once." On March 16 he resigne