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nsports, and 197 supply vessels. So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part of authorities at home. It was not thoroughly thought out at the start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was ever taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was not wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000 Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months' time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually everything needed in the campaign. Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged 150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm. The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914. REFERENCES BRITISH OFFICIAL NAVAL HISTORY, Sir Julian Corbett, London, 1920. THE GRAND FLEET, Admiral Jellicoe, London, 1918. THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, Arthur H. Pollen, London, 1919. MY MEMOIRS, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919. THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral van Scheer, 1920. U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, WAR NOTES, 1914-1918. LES ENSEIGNEMENTS MARITIMES DE LA GUERRE ANTI-GERMANIQUE, Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919. IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, Captain Romeo Bernotti, Leghorn, 1920. NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, Commander C. C. Gill, New York, 1918. CHAPTER XVII THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the German High
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