fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees),
the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British
13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater
angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore
lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy,
12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report,
the first salvo that hit the _Seydlitz_ knocked out both after-turrets
and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved only by flooding
the magazines.[1]

[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in _Naval and Military Record_,
London, March 24, 1920.]

_The Dardanelles Campaign_

Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils
as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western
sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near
East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria)
threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under
Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division
of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the
Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking
the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that
would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications.
Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers
ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere.

On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an
Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged
the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance
save perhaps as a warning to the Turks of trouble later on. In the
same month the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston
Churchill, proposed an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method
of defending Egypt"; but it was not seriously considered until, on
January 2, Russia sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve
her forces in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister
of War, answered favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops
to spare, turned the solution over to the Navy.

From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations.
Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity--and it is significant
that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed
Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-te