an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag
in the _Princess Royal_, but during the remainder of the battle Rear
Admiral Moore in the _Tiger_ had command. Judging from the fact
that the _Tiger_ was hit only 8 times in the entire action
and the _Princess Royal_ and the _New Zealand_ not at all, there
seems to have been little effort at this time to press the attack.
The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned back at noon.

In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was
raised why the _Bluecher_ was included in the German line. Any encounter
that developed on such an excursion was almost certain to be with
superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would be of
slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down the
whole squadron, or else must be left behind.

During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three
knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45
is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding
degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of
the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers,
which now figured for the first time as important factors in day
action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another
about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas,
they both caused interference with the British course and fire.

The injury to the _Lion_, in the words of Admiral Beatty, "undoubtedly
deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless caught
calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this seems
strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared by
the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the
danger to the _Lion_ in case of retreat before superior forces, and
in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine
fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland
was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured;
the course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand
Fleet was rapidly approaching the scene. The element of caution,
seen again in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have
prevented pressing the engagement to more decisive results.

[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 10,
1919.]

The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank
emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to
the