that he directs their
malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for the execution
of his judgments. The modesty of those who are alarmed by absurdity, might
perhaps be excusable, if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine
justice from all accusation by _a pretence utterly destitute of any
foundation in truth_."(59) Here the distinction between God's _permitting_
and _doing_ in relation to the sins of men, is declared by Calvin to be
utterly without foundation in truth, and purely chimerical. So, in various
other places, he treats this distinction as "too weak to be supported."
"The will of God," says he, "is the supreme and first cause of things;"
and he quotes Augustine with approbation to the effect, that "He does not
remain an idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an
intervention of an actual volition, if I may be allowed the expression,
which otherwise could never be considered a cause."(60) According to
Calvin, then, nothing ever happens in the universe, not even the sinful
volitions of men, which is not caused by God, even by "the intervention of
an actual volition" of the supreme will.

It is evident that Calvin scorns to have any recourse to a permissive will
in God, in order to soften down the stupendous difficulties under which
his system seems to labour. On the contrary, he sometimes betrays a little
impatience with those who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged
features of what he conceived to be the truth. "The fathers," says he,
"are sometimes too scrupulous on this subject, and afraid of a simple
confession of the truth."(61) He entertains no such fears. He is even bold
and rigid enough in his consistency to say, "that God often actuates the
reprobate by the interposition of Satan, but in such a manner that Satan
himself acts his part by the divine impulse."(62) And again, he declares
that by means of Satan, "God excites the will and strengthens the efforts"
of the reprobate.(63) Indeed, his great work, whenever it touches upon
this awful subject, renders it perfectly clear that Calvin despises all
weak evasions in the advocacy of his stern doctrine.

It has been truly said, that Calvin never thinks of "deducing the fall of
man from the abuse of human freedom." So far is he from this, indeed, that
he seems to lose his patience with those who trace the origin of moral
evil to such a source. "They say it is nowhere declared in express terms,"
says Calvin, "that