eason to
say of moral evil, that God only permits it, and that he does not will it.
But what is more important, we show that God can not only permit sin, but
even concur therein, and contribute to it, without prejudice to his
holiness; although, absolutely speaking, he might have prevented it." Such
is the task which Leibnitz has undertaken to perform; let us see how he
has accomplished it.

"The ancients," says he, "attributed the cause of evil to matter; but
where shall we, who derive all things from God, find the source of
evil?"(71) He has more than once answered this question, by saying that
the source of evil is to be found in the ideas of the divine mind.
"Chrysippus," says he, "has reason to allege that vice comes from the
original constitution of some spirits. It is objected to him that God has
formed them; and he can only reply, that the imperfection of matter does
not permit him to do better. This reply is good for nothing; for matter
itself is indifferent to all forms, and besides God has made it. Evil
comes rather from forms themselves, but abstract; that is to say, from
ideas that God has not produced by an act of his will, no more than he has
produced number and figures; and no more, in one word, than all those
possible essences which we regard as eternal and necessary; for they find
themselves in the ideal region of possibles; that is to say, in the divine
understanding. God is then not the author of those essences, in so far as
they are only possibilities; but there is nothing actual, but what he
discerned and called into existence; and he has permitted evil, because it
is enveloped in the best plan which is found in the region of possibles;
that plan the supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. It is this notion
which at once satisfies the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of God,
and yet leaves room for the entrance of evil."(72)

In reading the lofty speculations of Leibnitz, we have been often led to
wonder how one, whose genius was so great, could have permitted himself to
rest in conceptions which appear so vague and indistinct. In the above
passage we have both light and obscurity; and we find it difficult to
determine which predominates over the other. We are clearly told that God
is not the author of evil, because this proceeds from abstract forms which
were from all eternity enveloped in his understanding, and not from any
operation of his will. But how does evil proceed from abstract forms;