d be just in causing man to sin, and then punishing
him for it? Calvin replies, That all his dealings with us "are guided by
equity."(67) We know, indeed, that all his ways are guided by the most
absolute and perfect justice; and this is the very circumstance which
creates the difficulty. The more clearly we perceive, and the more vividly
we realize, the perfection of the divine equity, the more heavily does the
difficulty press upon our minds. This assurance brings us no relief; we
still demand, if God be just, as in truth he is, how can he deal with us
after such a manner? The answer we obtain is, that God is just. And if
this does not satisfy us, we are reminded that "it is impossible ever
wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety."(68) We seek for
light, and, instead of light, we are turned off with reproaches for the
want of piety. We have not that faith, we humbly confess, which "from its
exaltation looks down on these mists with contempt;"(69) but we have a
reason, it may be "a carnal understanding," which longs to be enlarged and
enlightened by faith. Hence, it cannot but murmur when, instead of being
enlarged and enlightened by faith, it is utterly overwhelmed and
confounded by it. And these murmurings of reason, which we can no more
prevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean from its
depths, are met and sought to be quelled with the rebuke, "Who art thou, O
man, that repliest against God?" We reply not against God, but against
man's interpretation of God's word; and who art thou, O man, that puttest
thyself in the place of God? "Men," saith Bacon, "are ever ready to usurp
the style, '_Non ego, sed Dominus_;' and not only so, but to bind it with
the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of
those who have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon, that the
'causeless curse shall not come.' "
In relation to the subject under consideration, the amiable and
philosophic mind of Melanchthon seems to have been more consistent, at one
time, than that of most of the reformers. "He laid down," says D'Aubigne,
"a sort of fatalism, which might lead his readers to think of God as the
author of evil, and which consequently has no foundation in Scripture:
'since whatever happens,' said he, 'happens by necessity, agreeably to
divine foreknowledge, it is plain our will hath no liberty whatever.' " It
is certainly a very mild expression to say, that the doctrine of
Melanchtho
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