n of the present chapter to consider the doctrine of
necessity under its other aspect, and to demonstrate that it makes God the
author of sin. If this can be shown, it may justly lead us to suspect that
the scheme contains within its bosom some dark fallacy, which should be
dragged from its hiding-place into the open light of day, and exposed to
the abhorrence and detestation of mankind.

In discussing this branch of our subject, we shall pursue the course
adopted in relation to the first; for if the doctrine of necessity does
not make God the author of sin, we may conclude that this has been shown
by some one of its most profound and enlightened advocates. If the
attempts of a Calvin, and an Edwards, and a Leibnitz, to maintain such a
doctrine, and yet vindicate the purity of God may be shown to be signal
failures, we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between
these tenets as maintained by them. Nay, if in order to vindicate their
system from so great a reproach, they have been compelled to adopt
positions which are clearly inconsistent with the divine holiness, and
thus to increase rather than to diminish the reproach; surely their system
itself should be more than suspected of error. We shall proceed, then,
with this view, to examine their speculations in regard to the agency of
God in its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil.

Section I.

The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that the system of
necessity does not make God the author of sin.

Most of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured to soften
their views, so as to bring them into a conformity with the common
sentiments of mankind, by supposing that God merely _permits_, without
_producing_ the sinful volitions of men. But Calvin rejects this
distinction with the most positive disdain. "A question of still greater
difficulty arises," says he, "from other passages, where God is said to
incline or draw Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal
understanding scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means, and even
in operations common to himself and them, is free from any fault, and yet
righteously condemns those whose ministry he uses. Hence was invented the
distinction between _doing_ and _permitting_; because to many persons this
has appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious
are subject to the power and government of God, so