285 (1910).

[618] Travis _v._ Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1920).

[619] League _v._ Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).

[620] Palmer _v._ McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).

[621] Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. _v._ Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).

[622] King _v._ Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman _v._ Zobelein, 237
U.S. 135 (1915).

[623] Leigh _v._ Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).

[624] Davidson _v._ New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).

[625] Dewey _v._ Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).

[626] League _v._ Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). _See also_ Straus
_v._ Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913).

[627] Exercisable as to every description of property, tangibles and
intangibles including choses in action, contracts, and charters, but
only for a public purpose, the power of eminent domain may also be
conferred by the State upon municipal corporations, public utilities,
and even upon individuals. Like every other governmental power, the
power of eminent domain cannot be surrendered by the State or its
subdivisions either by contract or by any other means.--Long Island
Water Supply Co. _v._ Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Offield _v._ New
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Sweet _v._ Rechel, 159 U.S.
380 (1895); Clark _v._ Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Pennsylvania Hospital
_v._ Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); Galveston Wharf Co. _v._
Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1923).

[628] Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920).

[629] 7 Pet. 243.

[630] 96 U.S. 97, 105.

[631] 166 U.S. 226, 233, 236-237 (1897); _see also_ Sweet _v_: Rechel,
159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895).

[632] Hairston _v._ Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).

[633] Green _v._ Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920); Cincinnati _v._
Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).

[634] Hairston _v._ Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).

[635] United States ex rel. T.V.A. _v._ Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-552,
556-558 (1946), citing Case _v._ Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), and
New York _v._ United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)--Concurring in the
result, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "the fact that the nature of
the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity
from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting."
Also concurring in the result, Justice Reed, for himself and Chief
Justice Stone, dissented from that portion of the opinion which
suggested that "there is no judicial review" of the question w