,
with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy were in agreement, acknowledged
regretfully that the view that the "Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth
applicable to the States * * * has never been accepted by a majority of
this Court," and submitted a list of citations showing that by judicial
decision, as well as by constitutional and statutory provision, a
majority of States require that indigent defendants, in noncapital as
well as capital cases, be provided with counsel on request. This
evidence, he contended, supports the conclusion that "denial to the poor
of a request for counsel in proceedings based on serious charges of
crime," has "long been regarded throughout this country as shocking to
the 'universal sense of justice.'"
[828] 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
[829] 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
[830] 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71 (1932).
[831] 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945).
[832] 324 U.S. 42 (1945). _See also_ White _v._ Ragen, 324 U.S. 760
(1945).
[833] 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
[834] 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945).
[835] 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
[836] 327 U.S. 82 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented, the
former contending that "the right to counsel means nothing unless it
means the right to counsel at each and every step in a criminal
proceeding."--Ibid. 89.
[837] 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
[838] Rice _v._ Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), was distinguished on the
ground that the record in the older case contained specific allegations
bearing on the disabilities of the accused to stand prosecution without
the aid of counsel and the complete absence of any uncontested finding,
as in the instant case, of an intelligent waiver of counsel.
Dissenting for himself and Justices Black and Rutledge, Justice Douglas
declared that, under the authority of Williams _v._ Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 476 (1945), "if * * * [the] defendant is not capable of making his
own defense, it is the duty of the Court, at least in capital cases, to
appoint counsel, whether requested so to do or not."--329 U.S. 173, 181
(1946). In a separate dissent, Justice Murphy observed that while "legal
technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of
ignoring plain facts before us," facts which emphasize the absence of
any intelligent waiver of counsel, "the result certainly does not
enhance the high traditions of the judicial process."--Ibid. 183.
[839] 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947).
[840] 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
[841] 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
[842] 332 U.S. 134, 136
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