ity. Rulings on both
these issues were made very early; and the Court thus far has manifested
no disposition to depart from them, although their compatibility with
more recent holdings may be doubtful. Thus, when the Enforcement Act of
1870,[15] which penalized State officers for refusing to receive the
vote of any qualified citizen, was employed to support a prosecution of
such officers for having prevented a qualified Negro from voting, the
Court held it to be in excess of the authority conferred upon
Congress.[16] The Fifteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Waite maintained,
did not confer "authority to impose penalties for every wrongful refusal
to receive * * * [a] vote * * *, [but] only when the wrongful refusal
* * * is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
* * *" Voided for the like reason that this amendment "relates solely to
action 'by the United States or by any State,' and does not contemplate
wrongful individual acts" was another provision of the same act, which
authorized prosecution of private individuals for having prevented
citizens from voting at a Congressional election.[17]
Notes
[1] United States _v._ Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-218 (1876); United States
_v._ Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876).
[2] 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884); citing Neal _v._ Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
389 (1881). This affirmative view was later reiterated in Guinn _v._
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363 (1915).
[3] Guinn _v._ United States, 238 U.S. 347, 360, 363-364 (1915).
[4] Lane _v._ Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
[5] Ibid. 275.
[6] Cases involving this and related issues are also discussed under the
equal protection clause, p. 1163.
[7] United States _v._ Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith _v._
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
[8] Nixon _v._ Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
[9] Nixon _v._ Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932).
[10] Grovey _v._ Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935).
[11] 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Notwithstanding that the South Carolina
Legislature, after the decision in Smith _v._ Allwright, repealed all
statutory provisions regulating primary elections and political
organizations conducting them, a political party thus freed of control
is not to be regarded as a private club and for that reason exempt from
the constitutional prohibitions against racial discrimination contained
in the Fifteenth Amendment. Rice _v._ Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (1947);
certiorari denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948). _See also
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