6).

[1206] Cassell _v._ Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill _v._ Texas, 316
U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith _v._ Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre _v._
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Virginia _v._ Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1880).

[1207] Virginia _v._ Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322, 323 (1880).

[1208] Akins _v._ Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).

[1209] Patton _v._ Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). _See also_ Shepherd
_v._ Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).

[1210] Gibson _v._ Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).

[1211] Rawlins _v._ Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).

[1212] 332 U.S. 261 (1947).

In an interesting footnote to his opinion, Justice Jackson asserted that
"it is unnecessary to decide whether the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment might of its own force prohibit discrimination on
account of race in the selection of jurors, so that such discrimination
would violate the due process clause of the same Amendment." Ibid. 284.
Earlier cases dealing with racial discrimination have indicated that the
discrimination was forbidden by the equal protection clause as well as
by the Civil Rights Act of 1875. _See_ cases cited to the preceding
paragraph. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Section "Selection of
Jury", above.]

[1213] Ibid. 285.

[1214] Ibid. 270, 271.

[1215] Ibid. 291.

[1216] Ibid. 288, 289, 299, 300. Four Justices, speaking by Justice
Murphy dissented, saying: "The proof here is adequate enough to
demonstrate that this panel, like every discriminatorily selected 'blue
ribbon' panel, suffers from a constitutional infirmity. That infirmity
is the denial of equal protection to those who are tried by a jury drawn
from a 'blue ribbon' panel. Such a panel is narrower and different from
that used in forming juries to try the vast majority of other accused
persons. To the extent of that difference, therefore, the persons tried
by 'blue ribbon' juries receive unequal protection." "In addition, as
illustrated in this case, the distinction that is drawn in fact between
'blue ribbon' jurors and general jurors is often of such a character as
to destroy the representative nature of the 'blue ribbon' panel. There
is no constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group of uneducated
and unintelligent persons. Nor is there any right to a jury chosen
solely from those at the lower end of the economic and social scale. But
there is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which
represents a cross-section