time might well improve. The
Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to imprison the States into the
limited experience of the eighteenth century. It did mean to withdraw
from the States the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent
respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom.

"These are very broad terms by which to accommodate freedom and
authority. As has been suggested * * *, they may be too large to serve
as the basis for adjudication in that they allow much room for
individual notions of policy. That is not our concern. The fact is that
the duty of such adjudication on a basis no less narrow has been
committed to this Court.

"In an impressive body of decisions this Court has decided that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a demand for
civilized standards which are not defined by the specifically enumerated
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. They neither contain the
particularities of the first eight amendments nor are they confined to
them. * * * Insofar as due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the States to observe any of the immunities 'that are as valid
as against the Federal Government by force of the specific pledges of
particular amendments' it does so because they 'have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the States,'" [citing
Palko _v._ Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324, 325 (1937).]--Ibid. 467-469.

Justice Burton, with whom Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge were
associated, dissented on the grounds that "the proposed repeated, and at
least second, application to the * * * [defendant] of an electric
current sufficient to cause death is * * *, a cruel and unusual
punishment violative of due process of law."--Ibid. 479.

In Solesbee _v._ Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Court declined to
intervene in case coming up from Georgia in which appellant, claiming
that he had become insane following conviction and sentence of death,
sought a postponement of execution from the governor of the State.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, asserting that the due process clause of
Amendment XIV prohibits a State from executing an insane convict.

[975] 187 U.S. 71, 86 (1902). _See also_ Keerl _v._ Montana, 213 U.S.
135 (1909).

[976] 177 U.S. 155 (1900).

[977] 207 U.S. 188 (1907).

[978] Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912).

[979] 302 U.S. 319 (193