7).

[980] In a lengthy dictum, Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court,
rejected the defendant's view that "Whatever would be a violation of the
original bill of rights (Amendments One to Eight) if done by the federal
government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment
if done by a state." By a selective process of inclusion and exclusion,
he conceded that "the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may
make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of
speech which the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the
Congress, * * * or the like freedom of the press, * * * or the free
exercise of religion, * * * or the right of peaceable assembly * * *, or
the right of one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel." However,
insofar as such "immunities, [which] are valid as against the Federal
Government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments,
have become valid as against the States," that result is attributable,
not to the absorption by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of particular provisions of the Bill of Rights, but to the
fact that such immunities "have been found to be implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty * * *" protected by that clause.--Ibid. 323, 324-325.

[981] Justice Butler dissented without an opinion.

[982] 320 U.S. 459, 462, 463 (1947).--In line with its former ruling in
Graham _v._ West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), the Court reiterated in
Gryger _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), that a life sentence imposed on
a fourth offender under a State habitual criminal act is a stiffened
penalty for his latest offense, which is considered to be an aggravated
offense because a repetitive one, and is therefore not invalid as
subjecting the offender to a new jeopardy.

[983] Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).

[984] White _v._ Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 n. 1 (1945).

[985] McKane _v._ Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); Andrews _v._ Swartz
156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Murphy _v._ Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158
(1900); Reetz _v._ Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).

[986] Thus, where on the day assigned for hearing of a writ of error, it
appeared that the accused had escaped from jail, the Court, without
denial of due process, could order that the writ be dismissed unless the
accused surrender himself within 60 days or be captured.--Allen _v._
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).

[987] Carter _v._ Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 17