, and that it took a ruling of
the Texas appellate court to settle the issue whether such comment was
improper under Texas practice, Justice Douglas concluded that the record
suggests only that "the judge picked a quarrel with this lawyer and used
his high position to wreak vengeance." There having been no substantial
obstruction of the trial, Justice Murphy believed that the trial judge's
use of his power was inconsistent with due process; whereas Justice
Rutledge, in dissenting, contended "there can be no due process in trial
in the absence of calm judgment and action, untinged with anger, from
the bench."--Ibid. 165-166, 167, 169.

[957] Tumey _v._ Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). _See also_ Jordan _v._
Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).

[958] "Unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be
properly ignored as within the maxim _de minimis non curat lex_."--_See_
Tumey _v._ Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531 (1927).

[959] Dugan _v._ Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).

[960] Frank _v._ Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).

[961] Moore _v._ Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).

[962] Thiel _v._ Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). _See also_
Fay _v._ New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), _supra_ p. 1110. [Transcriber's
Note: Reference is to Footnote 873, above.]

[963] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934).

[964] Lisenba _v._ California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

[965] Buchalter _v._ New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943). The Court also
declared that the due process clause did "not draw to itself the
provisions of State constitutions or State laws."

[966] Powell _v._ Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Snyder _v._
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

[967] Cole _v._ Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 (1948). _See also_ Williams
_v._ North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942), wherein the Court also
stated that where a conviction in a criminal prosecution is based upon a
general verdict that does not specify the ground on which it rests, and
one of the grounds upon which it may rest is invalid under the
Constitution, the judgment cannot be sustained.

[968] Paterno _v._ Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 320-321 (1948).

[969] McKane _v._ Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).--The prohibition of the
requirement of excessive bail, expressed in the Eighth Amendment as a
restraint against the Federal Government, has never been deemed to be
applicable to the States by virtue of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendmen