tion for _habeas corpus_. The accused, after having been convicted
and sentenced to death for murder, filed his petition supported by
affidavits of a codefendant, who, after pleading guilty and serving as a
witness for the State had received a life sentence. The latter affirmed
that his testimony at the trial of the petitioner "was obtained by
deceit, fraud, collusion, and coercion, and was known to the prosecutor
to be false." Even though the California court had denied the petition
for _habeas corpus_ without taking oral evidence and without requiring
the State to answer, the Supreme Court upheld this action on the ground
that there was no adequate showing of a corrupt bargain between the
prosecution and the codefendant and that the appraisal of conflicting
evidence was for the Court below. Even if latter's refusal to believe
the codefendant's depositions were erroneous, such error, the Court
added, would not amount to a denial of due process.

[942] 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).

[943] 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Certiorari was denied, however, for the
reason that the State court's refusal to issue the writ of _habeas
corpus_ was based upon an adequate nonfederal ground.

[944] Schwab _v._ Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448 (1802).--This statement is
a dictum, however; for the issue presented by the accused's petition for
a writ of _habeas corpus_ was that the State appellate court had denied
him due process in ruling on his appeal from his conviction in the
absence of both the petitioner and his counsel and without notice to
either as to the date of its decision. Insofar as a right to be present
exists, its application, the Supreme Court maintained, is limited to
courts of original jurisdiction trying criminal cases.

[945] Howard _v._ Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (1906).

[946] 201 U.S. 123, 130 (1906).

[947] 237 U.S. 309, 343 (1915).

[948] Snyder _v._ Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

[949] Ibid. 105, 106, 107, 108, 118.--In a dissent, in which Justices
Brandeis, Butler, and Sutherland concurred, Justice Roberts insisted
that "it * * * [was] not a matter of assumption but a certainty * * *
[that] * * * the * * * privilege of the accused to be present throughout
his trial is of the very essence of due process," and, in that
connection, "the great weight of authority is that" the view by the jury
"forms part of the trial." Even if "the result would have been the same
had the [accused] been present, still the denial of the const