edent in favor of a more careful scrutiny by the
Supreme Court of State trials in which a denial of constitutional rights
allegedly occurred, see p. 1138.
[881] Ibid, 285-286.
[882] 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
[883] Ibid. 228-229, 237-241.
[884] 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
[885] 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941). This dictum represents the closest
approach which the Court thus far has made toward inclusion of the
privilege against self-incrimination within the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In all but a few of the forced confession
cases, however, the results achieved by application of the Fair Trial
doctrine differ scarcely at all from those attainable by incorporation
of the privilege within that clause.
[886] 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
[887] 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
[888] _See_ Baldwin _v._ Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
[889] 322 U.S. 143, 160-162 (1944).--All members of the Court were in
accord, however, in condemning, as no less a denial of due process, the
admission at the second trial of Ashcraft [Ashcraft _v._ Tennessee, 327
U.S. 274 (1946)] of evidence uncovered in consequence of the written
confession, acceptance of which at the first trial had led to the
reversal of his prior conviction.
[890] 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
[891] Ibid. 602.--Of three Justices who dissented, Justice Murphy, with
whom Justice Black was associated, declared that it was "inconceivable *
* * that the second confession was free from the coercive atmosphere
that admittedly impregnated the first one"; and added that previous
decisions of this Court "in effect have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the prohibition [of the Fifth pertaining to
self-incrimination] applicable to the States."--Ibid. 605-606.
[892] 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
[893] Chief Justice Stone, together with Justices Roberts, Reed, and
Jackson, all of whom dissented, would have sustained the conviction.
[894] Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented in part, assigning among
their reasons therefor their belief that the "subsequent confessions, *
* *, were vitiated with all the coercion which destroys admissibility of
the first one." According to Justice Rutledge, "a stricter standard is
necessary where the confession tendered follows a prior coerced one than
in the case of a single confession * * *. Once a coerced confession has
been obtained all later ones should be excluded from evidence, wherever
there is evidence that the coerced one has been used to se
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