rity concluded as
follows: "* * * to draw the line between this case and cases where the
maximum penalty is death is to make a distinction which makes no sense
in terms of the absence or presence of need for counsel. Yet it is the
_need_ for counsel that establishes the real standard for determining
whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair. And the need for
counsel, even by Betts _v._ Brady standards, is not determined by the
complexities of the individual case or the ability of the particular
person who stands as an accused before the Court. That need is measured
by the _nature_ of the _charge_ and the _ability_ of the _average_ man
to face it alone, unaided by an expert in the law."

[848] 334 U.S. 672, 683 (1948).

[849] 334 U.S. 728, 730, 731 (1948).

[850] 334 U.S. 736 (1948).

[851] Ibid. 740.--The majority also observed that "trial court's
facetiousness casts a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the
proceeding * * *"

Although Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton dissented
without an opinion in Townsend _v._ Burke, four Justices, Black,
Douglas, and Murphy speaking through Justice Rutledge filed a vigorous
dissent in Gryger _v._ Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 733, 736 (1948). Justice
Rutledge declared his inability to "square * * * [this] decision in this
case with that made in Townsend _v._ Burke. I find it difficult to
comprehend that the [trial] court's misreading or misinformation
concerning the facts of [the] record [Townsend _v._ Burke] vital to the
proper exercise of the sentencing function is prejudicial * * *, but its
misreading or misconception of the controlling statute, [Gryger _v._
Burke] in a matter so vital as imposing mandatory sentence or exercising
discretion concerning it, has no such effect. Perhaps the difference
serves only to illustrate how capricious are the results when the right
to counsel is made to depend not upon the mandate of the Constitution,
but upon the vagaries of whether judges, * * * will regard this incident
or that in the course of particular criminal proceedings as
prejudicial."

[852] 335 U.S. 437, 438-442 (1948).

[853] 337 U.S. 773, 780 (1949).

[854] 342 U.S. 184 (1951); _See also_ Per Curiam opinion granting
certiorari in Foulke _v._ Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951).

[855] 339 U.S. 660, 665 (1950).

[856] 342 U.S. 55 (1951).

[857] Ibid. 64.

[858] 335 U.S. 437, 440-441 (1948).

[859] Rice _v._ Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788-789 (1945)