t War must be 'superiority in the strategic
direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
have attained and their endurance.'[1]

[Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a
certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here
endeavouring to combat.]

To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
Cavalry.

Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally
well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in
case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to
recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all
European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:

1870.

463 Battalions.
460 Squadrons.
251 Batteries.
15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.

1902.

625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').
486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).
562 Batteries.
38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.
28 Pioneer Battalions.

This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
numerically an almost insignificant factor.

There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
particularly with regard to armamen