which
certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.
Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.
The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
great vulnerability.
On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'
This increased importance of the communications, which in already
exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel
the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.
All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
factors in the nex
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