march to
the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply,
and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it
will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be
overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to
false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or
introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon
the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after
a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the
essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the
Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical
concentration begins.
From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may
entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be
allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the
desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far
as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give
way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is
_intelligence_, not _security_.
This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because
fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two
purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of
intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body
of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either
purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.
To secure information--_i.e._, intelligence--requires concentration of
force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of the
field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going
on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, the
Cavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and may
in consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirely
uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires a
wide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exact
opposite of the concentration the provision of intelligence
imperatively calls for.
Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole
triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.
They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the
enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual des
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