cision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to
bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important
fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great
retreat, numbers alone can avail.
How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of
course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the
matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess
of what any existing tactical unit can supply.
If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to
horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in
the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the
organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be
able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling
of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges
even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only
lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the
protection of a retreat our role can only be a subordinate one. But
for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's
communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar
operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm.
Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite
mobility and independence.
At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is
all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of
necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even
partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders
without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to
act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.
It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is
to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in
peace.
CHAPTER III
STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY
We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which
can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its
employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest
economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be
practised.
This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we
can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best
possible way.
Primarily we must start from this axiom-
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