-that no portion of the Army
can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must
maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.

The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army
whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of
independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical
missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question
now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?

The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all
demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long
as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.

The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns and
their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where
independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the
field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties
and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are
really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the
former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to
will generally suffice.

There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service
with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly
duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes
the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and
reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the
independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army
to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat,
and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement
itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small
amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in
modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only
be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but
even then their field would be a very limited one.

Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy
that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to
be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can
get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based
on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may
have changed again and again. We have only to remembe