r the cases
which occurred in the last War (1870).
In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that
Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going
on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the
difficulties will be even greater.
In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an
action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of
the Divisional Cavalry.
If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will
suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the
Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and
points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under
observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by
the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army
Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the
flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of
his own Cavalry.
If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat
through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as
well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered
as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the
independent Cavalry.
Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons
may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms,
but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in
a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.
In Armies deprived of the screen of independent Cavalry the want of
Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even in those
Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases of
detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In all
these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and it
will have both to screen and reconnoitre.
The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances,
become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance
during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But
to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger
proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm
by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is
not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment
of Divisional Caval
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