, so that these may always act with
full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
Headquarters itself.

As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
will despatch executive orders to the several echelons concerned. The
line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
troop it is which is responsible for the direction.

But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined
with two other most important factors:

First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
common purpose.

This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
conception formed in the Leader's mind.

In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
secures success.'[5