stem of
intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return
of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to
regulate it accordingly.
Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the
main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength
must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in
the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and
cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we
completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as
it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.
_Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the
rear without pressing circumstances._ This is an absolute necessity if
we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards
these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in
order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or
cyclists.
If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons,
in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long
detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops,
must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)
Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but
we must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement,
because since its application depends upon a number of favourable
circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or less
illusory.
Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct
experience in this matter.
Another point, however, must be specially brought out--namely, the
necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper
channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the
principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is
of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the
War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with
their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to
dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find
themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their
subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in
1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached
Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.
The fault lay chiefly in t
|