the conduct of our operations,
concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both
of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our
undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our
objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness,
and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly
conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the
psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in
hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority
such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end
of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this
purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and
material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in
demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they
shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them.
If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the
highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on
the most necessary results in time of War.

The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our
German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to
endure.

As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those
commands which form the basis of our War organization--_i.e._, the
Cavalry Divisions--should exist already in Peace as concrete units;
and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each
other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be
realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were
definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would
more frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale,
to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.

It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of
organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division
in Peace than people generally imagine.

The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot
accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However
desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one
which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The
practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in
accordance with which the c