eivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.
9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
they are unnoticed by the enemy--_i.e._, can be executed under the
concealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor space
to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
undertake manoeuvres before attacking.
10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
must never be arranged so that a part follows in echelon
backwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment.
11. In case of a melee, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.
12. Out of every victorious melee one must endeavour, as soon as
possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if
possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
must be adequate for the attainment of this end.
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.
1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
always to be employed by 'Wings.'
2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
should be attacked from the flank.
3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.
4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.
5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can
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