be relied on for
success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the
zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake
those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in
peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and
penetrates through as far as one can.

6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
Cavalry.

7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.

8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.

9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
of the enemy's fire.

To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
317).

To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
and independence of the junior officers.

Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical
situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is
'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
to another--flank attacks, deploy