ufficiently
acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally
responsible for results.

Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,
these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present
pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for
reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry
itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,
except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and
development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion
when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry
with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,
and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to
secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of
considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,
and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.

The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a
scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by
arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be
made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to
further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although
such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large
bodies.

It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of
the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the
strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.
Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never
replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal
importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since
the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army
depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it
is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.

Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the
several problems is to be produced.

It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,
trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be
employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;
otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating
the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to
guard against this