ination
trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and
see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and
ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most
information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;
and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation
affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,
and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with
a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change
is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation
of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.
Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.

How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms
the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms
the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can
and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following
suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.

In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the
Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders
must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite
strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding
schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of
the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in
practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in
which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the
patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write
their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.

In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be
followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of
exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely
assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular
importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never
lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always
to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true
importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time
the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use
for the special operation.

The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often
happene