s
are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every
squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to
be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts
into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the
demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very
first days of mobilization.

Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased
above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct
in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will
exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than
formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had
a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent
elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the
front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the
fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and
others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot
possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day
straight across country. After a very short spell most of the
augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only
have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their
squadrons.

These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the
squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and
somewhat above it--say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would
mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our
Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization.
Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to
point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for
five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger
regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.

Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or
more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency
of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their
number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt
been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could
thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its
strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions
must be seen to be impractic