apart
from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
sense of superiority.
Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
increased.
We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as
impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of
the enemy's Infantry the role of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end,
unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
circumstances.
Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
special advantages offered by local circumstances.
The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in
the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fa
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