riving them of the power of breaking
through our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferior
Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but
fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about
collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it
secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the
actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between
the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.

The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of
superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual
superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their
duties in the true Cavalry spirit.

On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of
screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's
patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the
scale.

How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who
have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when
they are actually compelled?

The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always
find himself mistaken in War.

That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as
stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an
action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without
saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that
already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter
with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the
principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and
that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of the
advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.

These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory
obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear.

Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to
screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of
action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the
proper form at the right time and place.

A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of
the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly,
in the advantage of our screening force.

The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that