truction of
both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the
interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of
front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must
concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary
degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave
reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which
evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous
points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus
obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.

I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any
systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient
results.

Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.

Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable
information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and
still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?
How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when
we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country
between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well
as we!

Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the
enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through
the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of
use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are
compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected
country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite
rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern
War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.

If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing
communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to
beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation
sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the
greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy
chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective
of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes
compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry
out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the
enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving
them off the ground and dep