derations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.
But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.
If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
direction its further evolution can be initiated.
We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
each individual phase principally depends.
In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of
hostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
points that opinion is as yet not united.
Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
important results are to be obtained.
CHAPTER II
DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR
The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the
fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted
execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops
and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the
consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first
battle--retreat or pursuit--is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted
action of the rearward co
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