mmunications, make it indubitable that it is
of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of
the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a
position of material and strategic advantage.

Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with
overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a
standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate,
whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their
mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be
advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and
railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into
the zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy.
Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German and
Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by light
infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a war
footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.

On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice
to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our
horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and
consternation into our zone of assembly.

It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable
damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first,
what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the
relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the
probable losses they must necessarily entail.

Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion,
lead us to negative such undertakings--on our side, at any rate. In
the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable
organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the
front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either
altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least
render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be
the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament
and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where
the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually
unfavourable--as, for instance, in wide open districts--or where there
is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even
if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilizati