thout serious
losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against
the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in
its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted
his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After
all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences,
after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both
possible and important.
Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first
period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded
from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe
that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of
concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes
necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the
enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the
employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are
certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can
settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed
out so close behind them that the patrols and their following
squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the
intelligence they have collected.
In such enterprises tactical collision with the enemy's Cavalry and
his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be necessary to
support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.
But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which
are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow
ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.
In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All
that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their
opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work
round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to
attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important
decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort
should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive
attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such
levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and
isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above
all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of
the enemy's patrols, can well be left to
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