ore there were railroads and telegraphs, and when
democracy and nationalism were weaker than to-day. If to-morrow
morning our wisest and most forward-looking men were to re-constitute
Society and petrify it in peace, our descendants would be far from
content. {224} The best heritage that the world can have is not a
perfect constitution but a feasible principle of change.

A dynamic pacifism, on the other hand, must assume that the world is in
change, and that no peace is possible or desirable which does not
permit great international transformations. These transformations
arise from various causes. Thus a candid consideration of the facts of
international life must convince us that in the present era nationality
is a potent, vital and probably a growing force, and that many of the
ambitions and desires of men are mobilised nationally. The nations,
however, grow unequally and are subjected to unequal pressure by their
various environments. As a consequence certain nations become
increasingly dissatisfied with their place in the world, and naturally,
and in the present circumstances wisely, prefer the risks and costs of
war to their present position. Such nations have an interest in war,
if change cannot be otherwise effected. Moreover, it is clear to the
dynamic pacifist that certain classes by the fact of their position in
society are more bellicose than others, that classes grow at unequal
rates and exert a varying influence, and that certain classes may have
a direct and obvious interest in throwing their nation into war.

The neglect of any such dynamic conception of world society is revealed
in all the proposals of the static pacifists. For example, the
proposal to create a United States of Europe is based on a palpably
false analogy with the United States of America, and ignores grossly
the living principle of nationality. The states of Europe are either
nations or are approaching nationhood. They lack the racial,
linguistic and traditional bonds, which made the union of the American
colonies not indeed easy but at least possible. These trans-Atlantic
nations suffer from being jostled one against the other and their keen
sense of {225} national difference is accentuated by economic pressure
and by a perpetual fear of foreign military aggression. To unite all
these nations into one federal state, with a Senate, a House of
Representatives and an impartial Supreme Court, is not only a static
but a mechan