thus incur by entering upon an agreement
looking to international peace is perhaps less than the danger of not
entering since if Constantinople causes another world war, as it may if
not neutralised, it is by no means unlikely that sooner or later we may
be forced into the struggle. It is better to risk our peace in seeking
to avert a world disaster than to permit the great war to come.
There are other international policies which in favouring circumstances
might be urged by the United States at {292} the close of the war. We
might append our signature to international conventions defining and
guaranteeing a freedom of the seas, to agreements looking towards a
co-operative exploitation of backward countries, to laws regulating the
settlement of arbitrable international disputes, and to such special
conventions as might be made for the re-neutralisation of Belgium.
Upon the basis of such agreements, even though they were but tentative
and partial, we might enter with the other nations upon some form of a
League of Peace and International Polity, which would secure these new
conventions from being rudely disturbed by the aggression of one or two
powers.
Whether we help to carry out these policies at the close of this war,
will depend upon the balance of power then existing in Europe and upon
the mood of the nations. If Russia wants Constantinople, if Britain
insists upon the right of capture at sea, if France, Italy, Servia,
Roumania and the British colonies demand territorial gains without
compensation, and these powers are able to enforce their will, our
delegates to the Peace Conference may make representations and
suggestions, but will not be able to carry them through. Nor if the
Central Powers are victorious and unyielding, shall we be able to make
our advice count. No one power or group of powers could carry out such
a policy against the will of a majority or even of a strong minority of
powers. Unless the conditions at the end of the war are such as to
convince the victors (if there are victors) that it is wiser to
readjust the world than to get all they can, unless great nations like
Britain, France and Germany can agree that a groundwork for future
peace is more valuable than territorial gains and punitive damages, the
opportunity for a peaceful reconstruction will pass. New coalitions
will be formed; new wars will be fought.
It is of course possible that such an international {293}
reconstruction w
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