elgium. Even were these small countries to
be partially reimbursed for their special losses, they might still
hesitate. There would also remain the fear that some of the boycotting
nations would {244} be detached through economic bribery, with the
result that the boycott broken, the nations faithful to their
agreements would suffer. Finally, if Holland joined in a boycott of
Germany, she might within a few days be compelled to resist a German
invasion. An economic boycott might easily lead to war.
This obvious connection between economic and military compulsion is
often disregarded by men who dislike war but are willing to commit
their nation to participation in economic compulsion. The two,
however, are inseparable, though they may not be inseparable for each
nation. The boycotting nations must be prepared to prevent reprisals,
must be willing if necessary to fight. It is not, however, necessary
for each nation upholding international law to contribute equally to
this military compulsion. Certain nations might use their armies and
fleets while others, more remote from the struggle, might merely
continue to boycott.
It would not be possible, to enforce a decision against nations having
a preponderance of military power, nor even against a group with a
large, though not the preponderant share of military and economic
resources. Germany, Austria and Russia combined could not be
compelled. The essence of the problem, however, is not the creation of
a state of war between coalitions almost equal in size, but the gradual
adoption of a policy of peace by securing a unity of interest among so
large a group of nations that this group would hold a clearly
preponderant power over any other group. Just as peace within a state
cannot be secured where the law-breakers are a majority, so
international peace cannot be secured unless the preponderance of power
is clearly on the side of peace.
Even with a majority of nations agreeing "in principle," the
difficulties of actually creating a League of {245} Peace and
International Polity would be great. To carry out such a plan, to work
out modes of action which will conform to the world's evolving sense of
the necessity for more stable international relations, requires an
international machinery, concerning which nations and classes will
disagree. Some channel, however, is necessary for the flow of the
peace forces resident in the world. A machinery must be created whi
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