the
direction may be north or south or east. A trend of policy is made up
of innumerable deflections, small or large; it is an irregular chain of
successive actions, which do not all tend in one direction. Even if we
narrow our field of vision and seek to elaborate a more immediate
policy, we do not escape from the vagueness which inheres in all such
general conclusions.

In the main our problem consists in using the influence of the United
States to create such an economic harmony among the nations, and to
give each nation such a measure of security as to permit them to agree
upon an international policy, which will be in the interest of all.
The chief elements of this programme are two in number: to create
conditions within the United States which will permit us to exert a
real influence; and to use this influence in the creation of an
international organisation, which will give each nation a measure of
economic and military security, and prevent any nation from wantonly
breaking the peace.

How far we can progress towards such an organisation will depend upon
the course and uncertain issue of the present war. The war may end
with the Central Allies crushed, with Germany reduced in size and
Austria and Turkey dismembered. It may end with a lesser defeat for
the Central Powers and with lesser penalties. There may be an
inconclusive peace, which may either be a mere truce or a new basis of
agreement between nations disillusioned by the conflict. Finally the
war may end with the partial or even complete victory of the Central
Powers, either through their overcoming the united opposition of their
enemies or by detaching one or more from their alliances.

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What the United States can effect at the conclusion of the war will
inevitably depend upon which of these developments takes place.
Assuming that we ourselves are not drawn into the conflict, it is
probable that our influence will be larger if neither of the great
coalitions wins an overwhelming victory. If the Western and Eastern
Allies completely crush the resistance of the Central Powers, it is
hardly likely that they will concede to us, who have not borne a share
of the danger and toil, a large discretion in proposing the terms of
peace. Such an unconditional victory by either side would probably
lead to an onerous and vindictive settlement, for each coalition is
bound together by promises to its constituent nations, and these
promises cannot be