licts with the {278}
independence of a Montenegro or a Bohemia, some lesser form of
self-government must be discovered.

That lesser form of self-government might be sought in a local autonomy
under a federal government. It is not improbable that the political
development, of south-eastern Europe for example, will tend towards
group organisations based on the co-operation of diverse nationalities
and stocks somewhat on the Swiss model. If the political question
could be divorced from the question of the economic exploitation of
these small nations, and if each nationalistic group were permitted to
retain its language, traditions and _Kultur_, the result might be
better than a mere _morcellement_ of south-eastern Europe, with petty
nationalities fighting the battles of their big backers. In such a
larger Switzerland, each group might be represented in proportion to
its numbers, and the worst evils of the present racial contests be
avoided.

The important question in the present connection, however, is not what
the particular solution is to be, but whether any solution is possible.
It need not be a perfect but only a permanent settlement. Such a
settlement presupposes a concert among the Great Powers, an agreement
concerning their own problems. Given such an agreement, however, the
Powers could in time work out a Balkan arrangement, which neither
Servia nor Bulgaria, Roumania nor Greece would dare resist. In the
end, if the arrangement were definite, practicable, in reasonable
conformity with nationalistic lines, and with a strong and certain
sanction, the small nations would become resigned. To-day they have
boundless ambitions because the division among the Great Powers gives
them a chance of realising ambitions, and what ambitions they have not
to start with, Austria or Russia will lend to them on short notice. In
this sense and to this extent, the {279} nationalistic problem in its
worst form is an appendage to the vast struggle between the powers, and
it may cease to be provocative of great wars once a basis of agreement
is established among these larger nations.

With the best will such a basis of international agreement among the
Great Powers cannot be established in a few years. It requires a
gradual development, a progressive give and take, a continuous widening
of the principle of joint use. An international convention, altering
the rules of maritime warfare, would be a long step in this direction;