one or two economic coalitions
of west and central Europe (with their colonial possessions) would
furnish a far more stable economic equilibrium for the world than is
the present division of the powers. Each of these groups would have
both agricultural and manufacturing resources; none of them would be
imperatively obliged to fight for new territories. While there would
be friction, while one group would have a population in proportion to
its resources in excess of a neighbouring group, the sheer brutal
necessity of expansion which now forces nations to fight would be
largely moderated.

Such a division of the world into seven or six or perhaps fewer
economic aggregates though not easy is quite within {285} the bounds of
possibility. Three of these aggregates, Britain, Russia and the United
States, are already political units; the chief difficulty would consist
of western and central Europe. No thoroughgoing political amalgamation
of such countries as France, Germany and Italy is at all proximate, but
some form of economic unity is not impossible. The bond which would
join these countries might be less tight and therefore stronger than
the _Ausgleich_, which holds together the kingdoms of Austria and
Hungary. In the beginning it might be merely a series of trade
conventions terminable on notice; from this it might grow to more
permanent trade agreements and finally to a customs union. While the
opposition to such an economic union would be strong the forces driving
in this direction would also be powerful. As the really great nations
emerge, as Russia, the United States and the British Empire increase
their population into the hundreds of millions and their wealth into
the hundreds of billions, the individual nations of Europe will become
economically insignificant and economically unsafe. Only by a pooling
of their resources will they be able to escape from the crushing
superiority of the nations with large bulk and from an insecurity which
makes for war.

Even with such an economic rearrangement of the world the west European
coalitions would be unsafe unless they lessened the rate of increase of
their population. Never before has this population grown so rapidly.
In the decade ending 1810 western Europe (including the nations lying
to the west of Russia), added 6.3 millions to its numbers; in the
decade ending 1900 it added almost 19 millions. Despite a decline in
the birth-rate, the mortality has fallen