sia is at
the mercy of Japan; her Black Sea traffic at the mercy of Turkey, or
whoever controls Turkey, her Baltic Sea traffic at the mercy of
Germany, Denmark and England. No wonder Russia demands Constantinople,
which will at least open the inner doors of the Black Sea. But if she
gets Constantinople, she controls the whole Danube traffic of Austria,
Hungary and Roumania, and she herself is menaced by British and French
fleets at Malta, Gibraltar and Aden.

What is the probable, or at least possible, policy of Russia in such
circumstances? Not immediately, not inopportunely, but in the right
season? Clearly it is to build a navy which will secure her control of
the Mediterranean and thus protect her outgoing trade from Odessa and
Batum as well as her incoming trade. Although not pre-eminently a
naval power, Russia must ultimately seek to accomplish what Germany
tried to do--make it dangerous for England to menace her Mediterranean
and Red Sea trade even in war times. But to secure naval supremacy in
the Mediterranean means to threaten Egypt and India, thus breaking the
neck of the {250} British Empire. Given the present unfreedom of the
sea, therefore, Great Britain's vital interests oppose those of Russia
as they now oppose those of Germany.

This is the meaning of the historic British policy of the right of
capture at sea, the right of blockade, the right to use naval power to
work injury to the trade of hostile countries and to prevent colonial
expansion. The policy is a menace to the British Empire and to the
independence of Great Britain herself. It stimulates other nations to
outbuild Great Britain. And in the end that is at least a possible
contingency. If a generation or two from now Russia and Germany should
unite, Russia attacking in the Mediterranean and aiding Germany in the
North Sea, the British Empire would be put to a severe test. There
might be no way of saving Egypt and India or Holland and Denmark and
these outposts gone, Great Britain might be menaced and attacked at
leisure. If her navies were defeated she would starve. The rules of
naval warfare, which Britain has so long upheld, would be turned
against her.

It is thus to Great Britain's real interest to surrender this doctrine.
In the present war it has been of value, but only because Germany and
Austria were surrounded by powerful enemies, and all adjacent neutral
powers with sea bases were small enough to be intimidated. The