ement.
{255}
(5) Establishment of an international naval convention and of an
international body to enforce its decisions, to which international
body all powers, naval and non-naval, should be admitted.
An Anglo-American agreement to enforce such a convention could be made
the corner-stone of an international organisation, open to all nations.
A naval force of neutral powers would enforce the freedom of the sea in
the interest of England's enemies and in her own interest. With such
an agreement in force much of the present naval rivalry would lose its
meaning. If German commerce were safe in time of war, if she could not
be blockaded and her ships captured, she would have a weaker interest
in building against England. She might still desire a fleet to bombard
enemy coasts or to invade England, but even without such a navy she
would have a large measure of security. She might well prefer to
forego some of her naval ambitions in order to secure British
friendship. In any case even a naval disaster would not be so utterly
crushing to England nor so great a hardship to Germany as under present
conditions.
Naturally the value of such an arrangement would depend upon the belief
of the nations in its faithful enforcement by all the signatory powers.
International promises fall in value as wars come to be fought by
powerful coalitions instead of by individual nations, each immensely
weaker than the whole group of neutral powers. When all nations of the
first rank become engaged actively or by sympathy, the truly neutral
powers are too weak to exercise much influence. They cannot compel the
belligerents even to live up to their acknowledged agreements. What in
such cases is the value of a naval convention between England and
Germany, which neither of the {256} nations believes that the other
will observe in the day of trial?
The difficulty is a real one as the uncontrolled savagery and the
unnumbered violations of international law during the present war amply
prove. It is this doubt as to whether opposed groups will live up to
their agreements, or whether neutral groups will enforce such
agreements, that strikes at the root of international, as also of
national cohesion. If we believe that our neighbors will not pay their
personal property taxes, it is highly improbable that we will pay ours;
a nation, which believes that its enemy will violate an agreement
anticipates such action by violating the agreemen
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