t first.[4] Yet
without such international agreements no international concert is
possible. Moreover the very condition, which made agreements so
perishable during the present war (the number and strength of the
belligerents and the weakness of the neutrals) is one which itself is
likely to be remedied by agreements made in advance. If Germany,
England, France, Italy and Russia have even a qualified sense of
security concerning their over-sea possessions and their commerce, they
will be less likely to enter into these hostile, world-embracing
coalitions, which rob such agreements of so much of their value.
Especially would this be true if certain terms of the agreement--such
as the {257} neutralisation of strategic water-ways--could be effected
in peace times. In any case this evolving and increasing half-trust in
agreements is one of the fragile instruments with which we must work.
If, therefore, an international arrangement were made, or a series of
compacts were formed between individual nations, by which, for example,
a group of powers promised to attack any nation violating these naval
agreements (even if it pleaded counter violations by the enemy) a basis
of faith in the new arrangements would be laid.

There would remain, however, the question of colonies. So long as
there is no principle by which the colonial opportunities of the world
can be distributed, we shall have competitive nationalistic imperialism
and the constant threat of war.

[1] Quoted by H. Sidebotham. "The Freedom of the Seas." "Towards a
Lasting Settlement," by various authors; edited by Charles Roden
Buxton, London, 1915, p. 66.

[2] H. Sidebotham, _op. cit._, p. 63.

[3] "The European War of 1914. Its Causes, Purposes and Probable
Results," Chicago, 1915, p. 142.

[4] Some of the German defenders of the Belgian invasion claim that the
Germans were convinced that had they not used Belgium as a base for
military operations, England or France would have done so at the first
convenient moment, though possibly with Belgium's consent (which,
however, Belgium had no legal right to give). Whether or not this fear
was justified, it is evident that violations and proposed violations of
international law by one group of belligerents led to violations by the
other, reprisals were answered by counter-reprisals, and grave breaches
of international law by all belligerents were defended on the ground
that the opponent would do, or had done,