ational,
not national.

In actual practice the problem when to interfere is immensely
difficult. It is easy to say "let America assume her responsibility
for policing the world," but the question arises, "What in particular
should we do and what leave undone?" Should we war against Germany
because of Belgium, and against France and England because of Greece?
Should we fight Japan to aid China? Are we to mete out justice
even-handed to the Poles, Finns and Jews of Russia, the Czechs and
Southern Slavs of Austria, the Armenians and Alsatians? Should we have
interposed to save Persia from benevolent absorption by Russia and
England? Clearly we could not do these things alone, and to attempt
them would be to strike an impossibly virtuous attitude. Even if we
had the wisdom or the sure instinct to save us from error, we should
not have a fraction of the power necessary to make our benevolent
intervention effective.

To right the wrongs of the world, to build up a firm international
policy and thus to create and establish peace seems easier if it be
attempted in alliance with two or three other virtuous powers. But if
we unite with England, France and Russia, to maintain virtue in the
world, may we not, at least hypothetically, be playing a fool's {234}
part in a knave's game of diplomacy? May we not be simply undermining
Germany and Austria? To use our army and navy for such purposes would
constitute us a part of one great European combination against the
other, and our disinterested assistance might be exploited for purposes
with which we had no sympathy.

A proposal, at least potentially more popular, is the formation of an
Anglo-American Union for the maintenance of peace. It is assumed that
the two nations, and the five self-governing British colonies are
kindred in blood, inspired by the same ideals and united by a common
language. Their white population exceeds one hundred and fifty
millions. They are capable, energetic, individualistic peoples,
favourably situated on an immense area, and holding dominion over
hundreds of millions in various parts of the world. These Britons,
Colonials and Americans, by reason of geographical position, are naval
rather than military, and if they could hold the sea, would be able to
preserve peace in lands not accessible to military powers and to
dictate peace even to the military nations. Such an integration of the
English-speaking peoples would thus constitute a step