force or potential force, not in a purely
_laissez-faire_ policy, but in applying force to uphold a growing body
of international {228} ethics, increasingly recognised by the public
opinion of the world.

But a League of Peace, unless it is _more_ than a league of peace,
suffers from the same defect of not providing an alternative to war.
If Italy is not to attack Austria, some way must be found to protect
Italian interests in the Trentino and Trieste, and if Germany is not to
attack England, some security must be given that German commerce will
be safe and German colonial aspirations not entirely disregarded. If
the nations believe, rightly or wrongly, that their vital interests are
being disregarded in the peace which the League enforces, there will be
defections and revolts. Such a league would then become useless or
worse, since it can only exert an influence so long as it possesses an
immense preponderance of power.

The same defect inheres in a League of Satisfied Powers. Such powers,
preferring the _status quo_ to any probable revision of the affairs of
the world, are in the beginning united by a common conservative
instinct. But no nation is completely satisfied; each wants a
"rectification" here and a "compensation" there. The same
disagreements over the spoils of the world that would be found outside
such a league would also make their appearance within, and in the end
one or more of the satiated nations would join the group of the
unsatisfied, and the league would cease to be a guarantee of peace. It
would die of the endless flux in human affairs.

Similarly static is the proposal that all nations wait, or be compelled
to wait, a set term before beginning hostilities. In many cases such a
compulsory postponement would be advantageous in that it would favour
the mobilisation of the pacific elements in the community and thus tend
to prevent wars being suddenly forced upon the nation against the
national interest by a small, bellicose social class. The {229}
underlying theory, however, is that nations always go to war because
they are hot-headed, whereas in very many cases the decision to wage
war at the proper time is perfectly deliberate and cold-blooded.
Moreover, a compulsory wait before declaring war would alter the
balance of power between the groups of powers, and would adversely
affect certain ready nations, which could therefore only be coerced
into accepting the arrangement. Unless some ade