t task to which Gordon addressed himself was to place Khartoum
and the detached work at Omdurman on the left bank of the White Nile
in a proper state of defence, and he especially supervised the
establishment of telegraphic communication between the Palace and the
many outworks, so that at a moment's notice he might receive word of
what was happening. His own favourite position became the flat roof of
this building, whence with his glass he could see round for many
miles. He also laid in considerable stores of provisions by means of
his steamers, in which he placed the greatest faith. In all these
matters he was ably and energetically assisted by Colonel Stewart; and
beyond doubt the other Europeans took some slight share in the
incessant work of putting Khartoum in a proper state of defence; but
even with this relief, the strain, increased by constant alarms of the
Mahdi's hostile approach, was intense, and Mr Power speaks of Gordon
as nearly worn out with work before he had been there a month.
When Gordon went to the Soudan his principal object was to effect the
evacuation of the country, and to establish there some administration
which would be answerable for good order and good neighbourship. If
the Mahdi had been a purely secular potentate, and not a fanatical
religious propagandist, it would have been a natural and feasible
arrangement to have come to terms with him as the conqueror of the
country. But the basis of the Mahdi's power forbade his being on terms
with anyone. If he had admitted the equal rights of Egypt and the
Khedive at any point, there would have been an end to his heavenly
mission, and the forces he had created out of the simple but
deep-rooted religious feelings of the Mahommedan clans of the Soudan
would soon have vanished. It is quite possible that General Gordon had
in his first views on the Mahdist movement somewhat undervalued the
forces created by that fanaticism, and that the hopes and opinions he
first expressed were unduly optimistic. If so, it must be allowed that
he lost not a moment in correcting them, and within a week of his
arrival at Khartoum he officially telegraphed to Cairo, that "if Egypt
is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed up."
When the British Government received that message, as they did in a
few days, with, moreover, the expression of supporting views by Sir
Evelyn Baring, they ought to have reconsidered the whole question of
the Gordon mission, and to have defined
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